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The Newly Murky World of Searches Incident to 
Lawful Arrest: Why the Gant Restrictions Should 
Apply to All Searches Incident to Arrest 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Jesus Perdoma stepped out of a large black SUV at the Omaha 
Greyhound bus terminal in the early morning of November 17, 2008, 
carrying a single bag.1  Without saying goodbye to the person nice 
enough to drop him off so early, Perdoma nervously started walking into 
the terminal.2  He was not alone, though; his behavior had attracted the 
attention of Alan Eberle, a plain-clothes Nebraska State Patrol 
investigator on duty outside the terminal.3  Eberle trailed Perdoma at a 
distance from the SUV to the ticket counter before sidling up behind him 
to hear Perdoma’s conversation.4  Eberle noticed Perdoma’s government-
issued identification card in his wallet as Perdoma pulled out cash to buy 
his one-way ticket under the name Jesus Cruz.5  Perdoma could not stop 
shaking.6  The pair left the ticket counter, and Eberle asked Perdoma if 
he would answer a few questions.7  Perdoma began lying: he did not 
have any identification and a cab, not an SUV, dropped him off.8  
Perdoma still could not stop shaking.9  Having talked to Perdoma for a 
short time, Eberle started to smell marijuana.10  He asked to see 
Perdoma’s wallet.11  Perdoma reached to his back pocket, pulled out his 
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 1.  United States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 747 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2446 
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 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
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 9.  Id. at 748. 
 10.  Id. 
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wallet, and paused before handing it to Eberle.12  Then he stuck his 
wallet back in his pants and took off.13 
After a short chase, Eberle and another trooper tackled and arrested 
Perdoma.14  He was handcuffed, restrained by the two officers, and 
moved to a different part of the terminal.15  At this point—with Perdoma 
arrested but with the bag away from him and under control of a police 
officer—should Eberle be worried about searching Perdoma’s bag 
without a warrant?  The answer to that question prior to the recent and 
transformative United States Supreme Court decision Arizona v. Gant16 
was unquestionably no.  From 1969 to 2009, no court would have told 
Eberle that he could not search Perdoma’s bag incident to Perdoma’s 
lawful arrest.  For these thirty years the Supreme Court emphasized 
creating clear rules to govern when and where police officers may search 
after an arrest to help them operate consistently in stressful and 
dangerous situations.  After all, policing is a terribly dangerous job, and 
the moments after an arrest are stressful and unpredictable; courts 
recognize that society must provide police officers a certain degree of 
leeway. 
Thus, for the last thirty years, the United States Supreme Court 
sought to produce bright-line rules granting police officers wide latitude 
in conducting a search after arresting a person.  Indeed, one United States 
magistrate judge aptly summarized the Court’s case law from this period 
by stating that “a search incident to arrest is absolute.”17  But this 
sentiment is no longer accurate.  In 2009, the Supreme Court in Gant 
reversed one major bright-line rule it had employed for decades in favor 
of a more fact-intensive and difficult-to-employ test.18  Gant’s narrow 
holding was that an officer no longer has absolute authority to search a 
vehicle after arresting one of its occupants.19  But, Gant’s broad dicta 
seemingly undermine numerous other bright-line rules giving police 
broad authority to search after an arrest outside the vehicle context.  This 
narrow holding coupled with broad dicta has left Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence regarding searches incident to arrest “in a confused and 
                                                          
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
 17.  Perdoma, 621 F.3d at 748 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 18.  Gant, 556 U.S. at 355–56 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 19.  Id. at 351 (majority opinion). 
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unstable state.”20  In this murky haze, a circuit split between two United 
States Circuit Courts of Appeals has developed over whether Gant’s 
restrictions apply to all searches incident to arrest, or merely to arrests in 
the vehicle context. 
This Comment asks and answers two questions.  First, do Gant’s 
restrictions limiting when an officer may search a vehicle apply outside 
the vehicle context to limit all searches incident to an arrest?  This 
Comment answers that question in the affirmative; Gant replants the 
exception in the Court’s historical precedents that do not lend themselves 
to bright-line rules.  Second, if the restrictions do apply, what is the 
proper test to apply them?  This Comment argues that the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s “access factor test” should be 
widely adopted.  Part II below summarizes the search incident to arrest 
exception’s case law, including Gant.  Part III outlines two courts of 
appeals decisions and one federal district court decision about whether 
Gant’s restrictions apply to all searches incident to arrest.  Part IV argues 
in support of the Third Circuit’s position that Gant’s restrictions should 
apply to all searches incident to an arrest and that other federal courts 
should adopt its access factor test.   
II. THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION: BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.21 
It is designed to “prohibit [] warrantless searches.”22  This oft-
repeated maxim often precedes a litany of exceptions to the general 
rule.23  One of these exceptions is the search incident to a lawful arrest.24  
                                                          
 20.  Id. at 363 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 21.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 22.  See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 711 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 23.  E.g., Angad Singh, Comment, Stepping Out of the Vehicle: The Potential of Arizona v. 
Gant to End Automatic Searches Incident to Arrest Beyond the Vehicular Context, 59 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1759, 1763 (2010) (“Nevertheless, the general rule that a warrantless search is unconstitutional 
has been significantly weakened by a plethora of exceptions that have greatly expanded the power of 
police to conduct warrantless searches.”). 
 24.  Id. (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004)).  For purposes of this 
Comment, the search incident to arrest exception will also be referred to as “the exception.” 
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This exception allows a police officer after arresting a person to search 
that person, the area around that person, and that person’s bags.25 
A. Chimel v. California: The Modern Origins of the Search Incident to 
Arrest Exception 
The Supreme Court recognized the exception before fully delineating 
its modern parameters in the landmark case of Chimel v. California.26  In 
Chimel, police officers served an arrest warrant on Chimel at his home 
for the burglary of a coin shop, but lacked a search warrant to search his 
house.27  Nonetheless, the officers searched his entire house after Chimel 
refused consent.28  The search was detailed and took nearly an hour while 
the police removed evidence of the crime.29 
The Court upheld the warrantless search and outlined the modern 
search incident to arrest exception: 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the 
latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or affect his escape.  
Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest 
itself frustrated.  In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting 
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in 
order to prevent its concealment or destruction.  And the area into 
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary 
items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.  A gun on a table or 
in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the 
arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person 
arrested.30 
Thus, the exception allows law enforcement to search “the arrestee’s 
person and the area ‘within his immediate control’—construing that 
phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a 
                                                          
 25.  Id. at 1766 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)). 
 26.  395 U.S. 752, 759–60 (1969) (noting an earlier decision which “has come to stand for the 
proposition, inter alia, that a warrantless search ‘incident to a lawful arrest’ may generally extend to 
the area that is considered to be in the ‘possession’ or under the ‘control’ of the person arrested 
(citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950))); see also Singh, supra note 23, at 1763–64 
(noting the Court spoke about the “right” to search incident to arrest in Weeks v. United States and 
outlined an expansive search power in United States v. Rabinowitz). 
 27.  Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753. 
 28.  Id. at 753–54; see also Chelsea Oxton, Note, The Search Incident to Arrest Exception Plays 
Catch Up: Why Police May No Longer Search Cell Phones Incident to Arrest Without a Warrant, 43 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1157, 1164–66 (2010). 
 29.  Chimel, 395 U.S. at 754. 
 30.  Id. at 762–63. 
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weapon or destructible evidence.”31  The exception’s two main 
purposes—officer safety and preventing destruction of evidence—still 
define the boundaries of the search incident to arrest exception.32  For the 
exception to apply, the search must occur contemporaneously with the 
arrest because the more time between the arrest and the search, the less 
likely the search can be justified as necessary to preserve officer safety or 
preserve evidence.33 
B. United States v. Robinson: A Clear Line for Searches of a Person 
and Containers Incident to Arrest 
After Chimel, it took the Supreme Court four years to address how 
the search incident to arrest exception applies to searching bags or 
containers that were on or had been connected to the recent arrestee’s 
person.34  In United States v. Robinson, Robinson was arrested for a 
driving license violation.35  After Robinson was arrested (and it is not 
clear if he was handcuffed or not) the officer began patting him down.36  
The officer felt something in his shirt’s breast pocket but could not tell 
exactly what it was.37  The officer reached into Robinson’s shirt pocket 
and pulled out a container, which turned out to be a “crumpled up 
cigarette package.”38  The officer then opened the cigarette package and 
discovered heroin.39 
The Supreme Court held that this search was a valid search incident 
to arrest.40  The Court reasserted Chimel’s policy justifications of 
allowing searches of the arrestee and the area within her immediate 
control after an arrest to protect both evidence and officers.41  The ability 
to search the person incident to an arrest, the Court held, is a bright-line 
rule: such a search is per se reasonable.42  The existence of an arrest 
                                                          
 31.  Id. at 763. 
 32.  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); see also Singh, supra note 23, at 1765 (“These 
twin rationales, officer safety and preservation of evidence, underpin the authority to search within 
the arrestee’s reaching area.”). 
 33.  Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764. 
 34.  See Oxton, supra note 28, at 1166. 
 35.  414 U.S. 218, 220 (1973). 
 36.  Id. at 223. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 224. 
 41.  Id. at 226. 
 42.  Id. at 234–35 (“This is an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes 
of search justification.”). 
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justifies the ability to inspect containers on the arrestee’s person.43  When 
those containers turn up evidence of a crime—even if not of the crime 
for which the arrestee is arrested—the officer may seize that evidence.44 
Importantly, the Court in Robinson overruled a circuit court holding 
that validity of a search incident to arrest after Chimel depends on a case-
by-case analysis.  The Court stated: 
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, 
while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not 
depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a 
particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be 
found upon the person of the suspect.45 
Also, the Court hinted at its desire to set forth bright-line rules and 
“rejected a suggestion that ‘there must be litigated in each case the issue 
of whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the 
authority’ to conduct such a search.”46 
Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas dissented in Robinson, 
arguing against the need to establish bright-line rules to govern this 
exception.47  A case-by-case analysis in which officers must show that 
the search was needed to either protect them or preserve evidence is 
preferable.48  This would not be the last time that these Justices would 
caution against bright-line rules.49 
C. New York v. Belton: A Bright-Line Rule for Vehicle Searches 
Incident to Arrest 
After Robinson set forth a bright-line rule allowing officers to search 
an arrestee’s person after every lawful custodial arrest, New York v. 
Belton extended that rule to searches of a vehicle after arresting an 
occupant of that vehicle.50  In Belton, a police officer stopped a speeding 
car, smelled marijuana, and instructed the occupants out of the car.51  
After arresting the occupants for possession of marijuana in plain view 
                                                          
 43.  Id. at 236. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 235. 
 46.  Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 620 (2004) (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235). 
 47.  See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 247–48 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 48.  See id. 
 49.  Oxton, supra note 28, at 1169–70 (discussing Justice Brennan’s dissent in New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)). 
 50.  453 U.S. at 460. 
 51.  Id. at 455–56. 
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and Mirandizing them, the lone officer returned to the car and searched 
the entire passenger compartment.52  In the backseat of the car, the 
officer found a jacket.53  The officer unzipped the jacket’s pocket and 
found cocaine.54 
The Court upheld the search as a valid search incident to arrest.55  
Because “courts ha[d] found no workable definition of ‘the area within 
the immediate control of the arrestee,’” the Court decided to set forth 
another bright-line rule.56  Just as Robinson granted police the ability to 
search containers on the person, Belton gave police the ability to search 
not only the passenger compartments of the car, but also any containers 
when they lawfully arrest an occupant.57  The Belton majority 
emphasized the need for “familiar standards” to guide police: 
When a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle 
to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of 
his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his 
authority.  While the Chimel case established that a search incident to 
an arrest may not stray beyond the area within the immediate control of 
the arrestee, courts have found no workable definition of “the area 
within the immediate control of the arrestee” when that area arguably 
includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is its recent 
occupant.  Our reading of the cases suggests the generalization that 
articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger 
compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not 
inevitably, within “the area into which an arrestee might reach in order 
to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].”  In order to establish the 
workable rule this category of cases requires, we read Chimel’s 
definition of the limits of the area that may be searched in light of that 
generalization.  Accordingly, we hold that when a policeman has made 
a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger 
compartment of that automobile.58 
And indeed, Belton did become a bright-line rule; for the next thirty 
years, until Gant, when an officer lawfully arrested a passenger of an 
automobile, she was able to contemporaneously search “‘the passenger 
                                                          
 52.  Id. at 456. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 460. 
 56.  Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 620 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460). 
 57.  Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. 
 58.  Id. at 459–60 (alteration in original) (footnotes and citation omitted). 
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compartment of that automobile’ and any containers therein” every 
time.59 
As he did in Robinson, Justice Brennan dissented in Belton.  The 
majority shortcut its analysis, he argued, by concluding that the entire 
passenger compartment is per se within the immediate control of the 
arrestee.60  This legal fiction should not displace fact-intensive tests to 
limit the exception.61  Justice Brennan warned that the desire for bright-
line rules will come back to haunt the Court.62  It seems likely that day 
has come. 
D. Thornton v. United States: Reasserting Belton’s Bright-Line Rule 
The Court addressed the exception thirteen years after Belton in 
Thornton v. United States.63  In Thornton, police officers grew suspicious 
of a driver, Thornton, after he veered into a parking lot as they pulled 
alongside.64  Noticing Thornton’s tags were expired, the officers 
followed him into the parking lot and asked him questions after he had 
left his car and was outside his vehicle.65  The officers grew concerned 
for their safety, so they asked Thornton if they could pat him down.66  He 
consented, and the pat-down search revealed a bulge in his coat that he 
admitted was drugs.67  After Thornton was arrested and put in the patrol 
car, the officers searched his car and found a gun.68  He was ultimately 
convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon.69 
Thornton appealed his conviction of being a felon in possession by 
arguing that “Belton was limited to situations where the officer initiated 
contact with an arrestee while he was still an occupant of the car.”70  
Because Thornton had left his car before encountering the police, he 
contended, the exception did not apply.71  The Court rejected Thornton’s 
                                                          
 59.  United States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 755 (8th Cir. 2010) (Bye, J. dissenting) (quoting 
Belton, 556 U.S. at 460), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2446 (2011). 
 60.  Belton, 556 U.S. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 61.  See Oxton, supra note 28, at 1169–70. 
 62.  Id. at 1170. 
 63.  541 U.S. 615 (2004); see also Oxton, supra note 28, at 1170. 
 64.  Thornton, 541 U.S. at 617–18. 
 65.  Id. at 618. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 619 (emphasis added). 
 71.  Id. 
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argument and maintained Belton’s bright-line rule governing car searches 
incident to an arrest: 
To be sure, not all contraband in the passenger compartment is likely to 
be readily accessible to a “recent occupant.”  It is unlikely in this case 
that petitioner could have reached under the driver’s seat for his gun 
once he was outside of his automobile.  But the firearm and the 
passenger compartment in general were no more inaccessible than were 
the contraband and the passenger compartment in Belton.  The need for 
a clear rule, readily understood by police officers and not depending on 
differing estimates of what items were or were not within reach of an 
arrestee at any particular moment, justifies the sort of generalization 
which Belton enunciated.  Once an officer determines that there is 
probable cause to make an arrest, it is reasonable to allow officers to 
ensure their safety and to preserve evidence by searching the entire 
passenger compartment.72 
The Court made a policy judgment that the need for a clear rule justifies 
less scrutiny of officer actions that implicate the Fourth Amendment. 
E. Arizona v. Gant: The Game Changer for the Court’s Bright-Line 
Rules 
In 2009, the Supreme Court changed everything.  Arizona v. Gant 
repudiated Belton’s bright-line rule permitting officers to search the 
entire passenger compartment and any container therein after any 
occupant’s arrest.73  In Gant, police were tipped-off to the location of a 
drug house.74  The officers approached the house, knocked, and Rodney 
Gant answered.75  After the officers left because the house’s owner, who 
was the intended target, was not home, a background check revealed an 
outstanding warrant for Gant, the man that answered the door, for driving 
on a suspended license.76  Returning later that night, the officers were 
watching the house when they saw Gant drive up toward the house’s 
driveway.77  The officers approached Gant and arrested him for driving 
on a suspended license as he parked at the end of the driveway.78  After 
handcuffing and placing Gant in the patrol car, the police officers 
                                                          
 72.  Id. at 622–23 (footnote omitted). 
 73.  556 U.S. 332, 350–51 (2009). 
 74.  Id. at 335. 
 75.  Id. at 335–36. 
 76.  Id. at 336. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
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searched his car consistent with Belton and Thornton’s absolute rule.79  
One officer found a gun in the car and another found cocaine inside the 
pocket of Gant’s jacket.80 
Gant moved to suppress, arguing that “Belton did not authorize the 
search of his vehicle because he posed no threat to the officers after he 
was handcuffed in the patrol car and because he was arrested for a traffic 
offense for which no evidence could be found in his vehicle.”81  The trial 
court rejected Gant’s arguments and upheld the search.82  The Arizona 
Supreme Court reversed.83  The court distinguished Belton on the 
grounds that Belton concerns searches contemporaneous to arrest and not 
those undertaken once an arrestee is secured, as Gant was once placed in 
the patrol car.84  The Arizona Supreme Court held that when the scene is 
secure 
the justifications underlying Chimel no longer exist because the scene 
is secure and the arrestee is handcuffed, secured in the back of a patrol 
car, and under the supervision of an officer . . . [therefore] . . . a 
warrantless search of the arrestee’s car cannot be justified as necessary 
to protect the officers at the scene or prevent the destruction of 
evidence.85 
The dissenting justices of the Arizona Supreme Court would have 
done like all other courts have for the last thirty years and “upheld the 
search of Gant’s car” because “the validity of a Belton search . . . clearly 
does not depend on the presence of the Chimel rationales in a particular 
case.”86  But the justices did note that Belton’s bright-line rule had been 
often criticized and “probably merit[ed] reconsideration.”87  The 
Supreme Court followed their invitation and granted certiorari to 
reconsider whether Belton’s bright-line rule, which had become divorced 
from Chimel’s original policy justifications, was preferable to a more 
nuanced test for when police officers may search vehicles incident to a 
lawful arrest of a recent occupant.88 
                                                          
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 337. 
 83.  Id. at 337–38. 
 84.  Id. at 337. 
 85.  Id. at 337–38 (quoting State v. Gant, 163 P.3d 640, 644 (Ariz. 2007)). 
 86.  Id. at 338 (alteration in original) (quoting Gant, 162 P.3d at 649 (Bales, J., dissenting)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 87.  Gant, 162 P.3d at 649 (Bales, J., dissenting). 
 88.  See Gant, 556 U.S. at 342 (discussing the circuit split following Belton). 
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Justice Stevens began the Court’s analysis where it always does: by 
stating that warrantless searches generally violate the Fourth 
Amendment, subject to only a few “established and well-delineated” 
exceptions.89  Then, the Court reiterated that the search incident to arrest 
exception is still governed by the original Chimel justifications of 
accounting for officer safety and evidence preservation.90  Chimel’s strict 
limitations “continue[] to define the boundaries of the exception” 
because those limits “ensure[] that the scope of a search incident to arrest 
is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and 
safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might 
conceal or destroy.”91 
Next, the Court reviewed its holding in Belton.  The Court stated 
Belton was simply recognition of Chimel in the vehicle context.92  But, it 
did note that courts had read Belton broadly as “allow[ing] a vehicle 
search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no 
possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the 
search.”93  This broad reading allowing searches when the arrestee could 
not access the area, the Court held, is unconstitutional because it 
“untether[s] the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel 
exception.”94 
Finally, the Court unequivocally replanted the exception in the 
original Chimel justifications.95  “[T]he Chimel rationale authorizes 
police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only 
when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment at the time of the search.”96  So, applying Chimel 
to the facts in Gant, the search was unjustified.97  “Neither the possibility 
of access nor the likelihood of discovering offense-related evidence 
authorized the search in this case.”98  Unlike in Belton, where it is 
possible that the need to protect officer safety still would have justified 
                                                          
 89.  Id. at 338 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). 
 90.  Id. at 339. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  See id. at 343. 
 93.  Id. at 341 (“This reading may be attributable to Justice Brennan’s dissent in Belton, in 
which he characterized the Court’s holding as resting on the ‘fiction . . . that the interior of a car is 
always within the immediate control of an arrestee who has recently been in the car.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 466 (1981))). 
 94.  Id. at 343. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 97.  Id. at 344. 
 98.  Id. 
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the search because the officer was drastically outnumbered and the 
arrestees were unsecured,99 in Gant, all three arrestees were secured and 
placed in patrol cars before the search took place.100  Therefore, Gant was 
not within reaching distance of the car.101  Also, Gant was arrested for 
driving on a suspended license, which means that there could be no 
evidence of the crime in the car.102  Whereas in Belton, the arrestees were 
arrested for drug crimes and it would have been reasonable to conclude 
that related evidence was in the car.103  “Because police could not 
reasonably have believed either that Gant could have accessed his car at 
the time of the search or that evidence of the offense for which he was 
arrested might have been found therein, the search in this case was 
unreasonable.”104 
Gant explicitly rejected Belton’s broad bright-line rule and, once 
again, tethers the search incident to arrest exception to its Chimel 
moorings.105  But, because this was a vehicle search incident to arrest, the 
Court’s holding addresses the proper scope of vehicle searches incident 
to arrest, not all searches incident to arrest.106  This relatively normal 
event—very broad dicta addressing the topic generally coupled with a 
narrow holding addressing the issue in the case—has led many 
commentators and at least one circuit court of appeals to hold that Gant 
does not apply outside the vehicle context.107 
Two phrases are key to understanding the difficulty of applying Gant 
outside the vehicle search context.  First is Justice Stevens’s 
pronouncement that a search incident to arrest is only reasonable when 
the “arrestee is unsecured.”108  In Gant, the arrestee was handcuffed and 
placed in a patrol car.109  But is the arrestee “secured” if she is only 
handcuffed?  What if she is handcuffed and surrounded by officers?  The 
second key phrase, which plays off of the first, is that such a search is 
reasonable only when the arrestee has “access” to the area being 
searched.110  Not only must courts determine if a person in handcuffs 
                                                          
 99.  New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455 (1981). 
 100.  Gant, 556 U.S. at 344. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 343. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See infra Part III. 
 108.  Gant, 556 U.S. at 343. 
 109.  Id. at 344. 
 110.  Id. 
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surrounded by police is actually secure, but they must also decide 
whether the person could access the container or the area being searched. 
Justice Scalia concurred that Belton’s bright-line rule was 
inconsistent with Chimel and the Court’s historical justifications for 
vehicle searches incident to arrest.111  But, he wrote separately because 
he felt the Court’s new rule—that “officers making a roadside stop may 
search the vehicle so long as the ‘arrestee is within reaching distance of 
the passenger compartment at the time of the search’”112—is not ideal for 
two practical reasons.  First, this case-by-case rule fails to sufficiently 
guide officers in the field.113  Second, and more interestingly, such a rule, 
Justice Scalia felt, is ripe for manipulation; it invites “officers to leave 
the scene unsecured (at least where dangerous suspects are not involved) 
in order to conduct a vehicle search.”114  After all, the best way to 
preserve officer safety is simply to arrest the person and put them in a 
patrol car.115  There is no reason, Justice Scalia argued, to go through this 
charade, and the police should just arrest the person if they have probable 
cause.116  Belton should be recognized for what it was: “a return to the 
broader sort of [evidence-gathering] search incident to arrest that we 
allowed before Chimel.”117  Thus, he would simply abandon the Belton–
Thornton line of cases that focus on the officer-safety prong and focus on 
the evidence-gathering prong of Chimel: 
[A] vehicle search incident to arrest is ipso facto “reasonable” only 
when the object of the search is evidence of the crime for which the 
arrest was made, or of another crime that the officer has probable cause 
to believe occurred.  Because respondent was arrested for driving 
without a license (a crime for which no evidence could be expected to 
be found in the vehicle), I would hold in the present case that the search 
was unlawful.118 
Importantly, Justice Scalia argued that the Court was addressing only 
the search incident to arrest exception.119  Officers can always search a 
person in a car under Michigan v. Long and the car search exception to 
                                                          
 111.  Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 112.  Id. at 352 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 351). 
 113.  Id. at 352–53. 
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the warrant requirement when “they reasonably believe ‘the suspect is 
dangerous and . . . may gain immediate control of weapons.’”120  “In the 
no-arrest case, the possibility of access to weapons in the vehicle always 
exists, since the driver or passenger will be allowed to return to the 
vehicle when the interrogation is completed.”121  Thus, getting rid of the 
police-safety justification is reasonable. 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Breyer, 
dissented.  Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion and joined Justice 
Alito’s dissent as well.  All dissenting Justices agreed that the bright-line 
rule laid out in Belton and followed for decades by federal and state 
courts should not be abandoned based on stare decisis.122  Additionally, 
the Court’s decision to abandon Belton and Thornton’s bright-line rule 
ignores the fact that police officers have been trained for decades on the 
rule and that the rule has proved workable in the field.123  While Justice 
Breyer would retain Belton’s rule primarily because of stare decisis,124 
Justice Alito argued that the Chimel Court likely did not intend for the 
area from which the arrestee may gain a weapon or destroy evidence to 
be measured from the area that the arrestee may access at the time of the 
search, as the majority held.125  Rather, the area should be measured at 
the time of the arrest, because by measuring it at the time of the search, 
the rule incentivizes officers to not secure the scene.126  Measuring the 
area to be searched at the time of arrest would allow an officer to secure 
the scene and search the car, which is essentially Belton’s rule. 
III. FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS 
Two circuit courts and one district court have ruled on whether Gant 
extends outside the vehicle context.  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit held that Gant extends outside the vehicle context to 
all searches incident to an arrest.127  The Third Circuit’s test allows a 
search if (1) the arrestee has “access” to the container and (2) one of the 
two Chimel factors—officer safety and evidence preservation—exists.128  
                                                          
 120.  Id. at 352 (alteration in original) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983)). 
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This Comment calls this the “access factor test.”  Conversely, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit declined to apply Gant 
outside the vehicle context.129  Lastly, although the Tenth Circuit has not 
addressed the issue, Chief Judge Claire Eagan of the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma held that Gant 
applies to all searches incident to arrest.130  She also adopted the Third 
Circuit’s access factor test.  This following section outlines these cases. 
A. The Third Circuit’s Approach 
The Third Circuit addressed whether Gant applies outside the vehicle 
context in United States v. Shakir.131  Shakir was arrested in the lobby of 
a casino pursuant to an arrest warrant for an armed bank robbery that 
occurred a month earlier.132  As the police placed Shakir under arrest, he 
dropped his bag on the ground.133  The officers then patted him down, 
waited for backup, and put him in handcuffs.134  Instead of placing him in 
a squad car, the officers held Shakir a short distance away while another 
officer searched his bag.135  In the bag, officers found cash from the 
robbery.136  Shakir later argued that evidence discovered in his container 
pursuant to a lawful arrest should be suppressed based on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gant.137  Shakir argued, consistent with Gant, that the 
search was unjustified because he was already secured by handcuffs 
without the ability to destroy evidence or gain a weapon from the bag.138  
The district court denied his suppression motion, and the money 
recovered helped win his conviction.139 
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to 
suppress.140  First, the court reasoned that although Gant’s holding was 
narrow, it was not so narrow, especially read in tandem with its broad 
dicta, that it applies only to searches incident to arrests when the area 
                                                          
 129.  See infra Part III.B. 
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being searched is a vehicle rather than a bag.141  The court explained that 
Gant applies to “any situation where the item searched is removed from 
the suspect’s control between the time of the arrest and the time of the 
search.”142  The Shakir court noted that the reason Gant applies broadly 
is because Gant refocused the exception on the policy justifications 
outlined in Chimel; or, in other words, the focus had returned to whether 
the suspect had the ability to access weapons or destroy evidence at the 
time of the search.143  The Third Circuit stated: 
[T]hat a search is permissible incident to a suspect’s arrest when, under 
all the circumstances, there remains a reasonable possibility that the 
arrestee could access a weapon or destructible evidence in the container 
or area being searched.  Although this standard requires something 
more than the mere theoretical possibility that a suspect might access a 
weapon or evidence, it remains a lenient standard.144 
After concluding that Gant applies outside the vehicle context, the 
court created a test to do just that.  The court held that a search is valid if, 
under all the circumstances, the suspect “retained sufficient potential 
access to his bag” in order to access a weapon or destroy evidence.145  
Under this test, the search of Shakir’s bag was reasonable.146  Shakir, 
despite being secured, retained potential access to his bag.147  Next, it 
was likely he could have gained access to a weapon.148  Therefore, the 
search was valid under Chimel’s officer-safety prong.149  He was near the 
bag, there was evidence that could suggest he had accomplices in the 
growing crowd, and was restrained only by two unarmed security 
guards.150 
Shakir was handcuffed, but the court still felt he was not “secure” 
under Gant because he retained potential “access” to the areas searched.  
Most lay people would assume that once a suspect is handcuffed, he is 
“secure.”  So, why not forbid all container searches once the suspect is 
handcuffed?  The court observed that under a literal interpretation of 
Gant’s unsecured requirement, “once a suspect is ‘secured,’ no searches 
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would be permitted incident to his arrest, regardless of whether the 
searched items are within his reaching distance.”151  The Third Circuit 
downplayed Gant’s focus on whether the suspect is secured or unsecured 
at the time of the search.152  The court felt this approach, especially for 
container searches, was too lenient for two reasons.  First, such an 
“aggressive” reading was inconsistent with Gant because Gant really 
focused on the suspect’s ability to access the vehicle, not simply on her 
secured status or where she was placed in relation to the car.153  If the 
suspect was secured, or placed in the police car, then she could not 
access the car.154  Indeed, whether the suspect is secured or placed in a 
car are only two of the many ways that a suspect could be seen not to 
have access to the area police wish to search.155  Therefore, the court 
focused on Gant’s second key phrase “access,” and concluded that Gant 
really “stand[s] for the proposition that police cannot search a location or 
item when there is no reasonable possibility that the suspect might access 
it.”156  Second, placing a suspect in handcuffs is not a final act of 
submission; indeed, the court noted, “handcuffs are not fail-safe.”157 
B. The Eighth Circuit’s Approach 
The Eighth Circuit has issued two opinions, both authored by Judge 
Raymond Gruender, addressing whether Gant extends to searches 
outside the vehicle context.  In contrast to the Third Circuit, the Eighth 
Circuit reads Gant narrowly and declines to apply it outside the vehicle 
context.158 
The first case handled by the Eighth Circuit and Judge Gruender 
addressing whether Gant’s restrictions apply outside the vehicle context 
was United States v. Brewer.159  Edward Brewer was arrested in his car 
for distributing crack cocaine after a prearranged buy with an undercover 
                                                          
 151.  Id. at 320. 
 152.  See id. (stating that Gant “could be read to prohibit the search of the bag unless at the time 
of the search Shakir was both (1) unsecured and (2) within reaching distance of the bag”). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
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agent.160  Having learned earlier that Brewer’s driver’s license was 
suspended, police officers trailed Brewer as he left the buy, pulled him 
over, and arrested him in the vehicle based on the license violation.161  
After arresting him for the license violation, the police recovered $800 in 
recorded bills that the undercover agent used in the buy from a pocket in 
Brewer’s pants.162 
Brewer moved to suppress the money, arguing “that the search of his 
van was not a valid search incident to arrest because, after he exited the 
van and was arrested, the arresting officers could not have reasonably 
believed that he could access the interior of the van.”163  Although the 
Eighth Circuit found this argument “nettlesome” for the government and 
that searches without warrants are presumptively unreasonable, it upheld 
the search as a valid search incident to arrest.164 
Exactly where the money was recovered—whether it was found in 
Brewer’s pants or from a search of the van—mattered to the Eighth 
Circuit.165  If the money had been recovered after an automobile search, 
then Gant would have applied166 and the state would have had to show 
that Brewer had access to the vehicle at the time of the search.167  But, 
the weight of the evidence showed that the money was recovered after 
searching Brewer’s person, not after a search of his car.168  Gant, the 
court held, simply did not apply to a search of a person.169 
The second case the Eighth Circuit and Judge Gruender handled, 
United States v. Perdoma,170 discussed at much greater length whether 
Gant extends outside the vehicle context.  In Perdoma, Jesus Perdoma 
moved to suppress evidence gathered from a search of his bag incident to 
a lawful arrest that occurred after he was handcuffed and surrounded by 
police officers.171  A plain-clothes police officer followed Perdoma as he 
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 171.  Id. at 748. 
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entered a Greyhound bus terminal.172  The officer overheard Perdoma 
buying a one-way ticket and noticed he was nervous and shaking the 
whole time.173  The officer approached Perdoma, identified himself as a 
police officer, and asked if he could speak to Perdoma.174  Perdoma 
consented to the casual conversation, but when the officer asked to see 
his wallet, Perdoma took off running.175  Officers quickly caught 
Perdoma, wrestled him to the ground, arrested him, handcuffed him, and 
moved him from the bus terminal’s lobby to the terminal’s rear area.176  
The Eighth Circuit panel was unclear on key facts surrounding the 
discovery and search of Perdoma’s bag.  Judge Gruender’s majority 
opinion notes that one officer searched Perdoma’s person and found 
drugs while a second officer simultaneously searched Perdoma’s bag in 
close proximity to where Perdoma was restrained in the terminal’s rear 
and also found drugs.177  Judge Bye’s dissent concluded that officers 
secured the bag in the terminal’s lobby after Perdoma was under arrest 
and then carried the zipped bag from the lobby to the rear of the 
terminal.178  Judge Bye noted that the record indicated that the search of 
the bag did not occur until “after Perdoma had been apprehended, placed 
in handcuffs, and removed from the public terminal.”179  The district 
court refused to extend Gant to this container search, and upheld it only 
because “it was reasonable for the officer to believe the defendant’s bag 
would contain evidence of a drug crime.”180 
The majority of the Eighth Circuit panel held that the search was 
proper.181  Judges Gruender and Gibson noted that although Gant may 
extend to searches incident to arrests outside the vehicle context, they 
would not rule on whether Gant’s restrictions extend to this context 
because Perdoma did not properly raise the issue.182  But, shortly after 
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that pronouncement, the majority signaled its belief that Gant really is all 
about car searches:183 
The dissent would hold that an arrestee who is restrained in some 
fashion by law enforcement necessarily is secured (as contemplated by 
Gant) such that a warrantless search incident to arrest of luggage in the 
arrestee’s immediate area can never be justified.  Gant does not support 
this logic. . . . The Court [in Gant] focuses exclusively on how the rule 
will affect vehicle searches . . . . 
 . . . . 
 The potential pitfalls of the dissent’s approach are aptly illustrated 
by a comparison of Gant to the instant case.  The defendant in Gant 
parked at the end of a private driveway and was arrested, handcuffed, 
and locked in the back of a patrol car before his vehicle was searched.  
“Under those circumstances, Gant clearly was not within reaching 
distance of his car at the time of the search.”  By contrast, here the 
record suggests that Perdoma was held in close proximity to his bag 
while it was searched.  Given our repeated recognition in the non-
vehicle search-incident-to-arrest context that it may be possible for an 
arrestee restrained in a room to reach items in that room, and without 
any argument as to why the Supreme Court’s reasoning with respect to 
reaching into a vehicle in Gant should control in Perdoma’s 
circumstances, we cannot say that the simple fact of Perdoma’s arrest 
and restraint left Perdoma “clearly . . . not within reaching distance of 
his [bag] at the time of the search.”184 
The majority then noted that courts have repeatedly recognized that 
even handcuffed arrestees can access items in the room around them.185  
The majority held that because Perdoma was near the bag when it was 
searched, as opposed to the suspect in Gant who was in the rear of a 
separate car at the time of the search, Gant’s restrictions did not apply.186  
In other words, simply putting an arrestee in handcuffs does not defeat 
the police’s ability to search the area around her and the bags she had 
when arrested.187 
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Judge Bye dissented, and argued that the Court’s desire to retether 
the search incident to arrest exception to the Chimel factors means that 
the same test for Gant controls every search incident to arrest: 
For one, all Gant does is return the analysis of the search incident to 
arrest exception to the familiar moorings of Chimel, a case that did not 
deal with a vehicle search.  Two, it is clear that Gant contemplates that 
its Chimel-based rationale would apply to non-vehicle searches because 
the opinion goes through [the] trouble of stating that the other part of its 
rationale—that based on Thornton v. United States—applies only in 
“circumstances unique to the vehicle context.”  And three, we 
previously have had little trouble concluding that the Belton principles 
translate into non-vehicle contexts.  There is no reason why having 
done so, we should now circumscribe invalidation of the same Belton 
principles to a vehicle context only.188 
Gant held that a search is valid only “when the arrestee is unsecured 
and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment” of the 
vehicle.189  Applying Gant to Perdoma’s facts, Judge Bye argued that the 
evidence found in Perdoma’s bag merited suppression.190  Perdoma was 
handcuffed and secured by two police officers.191  The bag was not in 
close proximity to Perdoma who was being searched contemporaneously 
with the search of his bag.192  He therefore was both secure and unable to 
access his bag at the time it was searched.193  The possibility that 
Perdoma could reach his bag was too remote to be a valid concern.194  In 
short, to Judge Bye, Gant applies broadly, overriding bright-line rules 
and restricting previously justifiable searches that are “untethered to any 
interest in protecting officer safety or safeguarding evidence.”195 
C. The Northern District of Oklahoma’s Approach 
In United States v. Cartwright, the Northern District of Oklahoma 
held that Gant applies outside the vehicle context and adopted the Third 
Circuit’s access factor test.196  Cartwright was a prison escapee whom 
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police tracked to an Oklahoma motel.197  Police staked out the hotel and 
approached him when he left his room.198  During his arrest, Cartwright 
dropped the duffel bag he had been carrying.199  When asked if he had 
any weapons on his person, he admitted there was ammunition in the 
duffel bag.200  Another agent walked Cartwright’s bag away from him, 
searched it, and found the ammunition.201  Based on that ammunition, 
Cartwright was charged as a felon in possession of ammunition.202 
Judge Eagan, like the Third Circuit, held Gant applies outside the 
vehicle context, and indicated that the access factor test is the best way to 
implement Gant.203  Judge Eagan outlined several important factors to 
consider when applying the access factor test, including whether and 
how the arrestee was restrained, where the arrest and search occurred, 
and whether the suspect was thought to be acting alone.204  Judge Eagan 
upheld the validity of the search of the bag incident to arrest because 
Cartwright still had an objectively reasonable ability to access his bag.205  
Lastly, the mere fact that the suspect is handcuffed and seemingly 
secured by the police “does not eliminate the risk that he will gain access 
to a weapon.”206 
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED APPROACH 
This Comment’s analysis section argues two main points.  First, 
Gant’s restrictions to the search incident to arrest exception—that a 
search can occur when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching 
distance of the area—should not be limited to the vehicle context.  
Second, the Third Circuit’s access factor test is the best way to rectify 
Chimel v. California’s policy concerns and account for Gant’s 
modifications.  Although factor tests do inject a modicum of uncertainty 
into police–arrestee encounters generally, such a test is the best way to 
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protect the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and ensure that 
exceptions are narrowly construed. 
A. Gant Should Be Extended to All Searches Incident to Arrest 
Although Gant’s narrow holding addressed only vehicle searches, 
Gant should apply to all searches incident to arrest for four reasons.  
First, access is the key factor in determining whether a search is valid 
because an arrestee must have access to the area to gain a weapon or 
destroy evidence.  Next, Gant resurrected and retethered the search 
incident to arrest exception to the original policy goals stated in Chimel, 
which itself did not concern car searches.  Third, by explicitly 
overturning Belton’s bright-line rule, the Court indicated that it is 
comfortable moving away from bright-line rules if those rules are 
divorced from Chimel’s policy goals.  Finally, broad application of 
Gant’s restrictions is consistent with the need to narrowly limit any 
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.  Just as the 
swordsman in William Goldman’s The Princess Bride was forced to 
restart his journey after straying from his goal, so too has the Court gone 
“back to the beginning,”207 deciding to restart its search incident to arrest 
jurisprudence while keeping the original justifications in mind. 
First, although Gant’s narrow holding addressed only vehicle 
searches, Gant’s reasoning extends outside the vehicle context.  Gant and 
the Third Circuit’s approach focus on whether the arrestee has access to 
the area to be searched.208  In Gant, the Court noted that no one argued 
that “Chimel authorizes a vehicle search incident to arrest when there is 
no realistic possibility that an arrestee could access his vehicle.”209  
When the arrestee cannot access the searched area at the time of the 
search, the Court noted, then there is no possibility that the Chimel 
prongs are satisfied; if there is no access, then the arrestee cannot get a 
weapon to harm the officer or destroy evidence.210  An access limitation 
“ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate 
with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any 
evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or 
destroy.”211 
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This reasoning extends outside the vehicle context.  For example, 
imagine that a police officer encounters a suspect whom she knows has a 
warrant out for armed robbery.  If the suspect drops her bag and is 
subsequently arrested and placed in the back of a police cruiser, can the 
arresting officer walk back to the bag and search it?  Before Gant—and 
in courts that refuse to extend Gant outside the vehicle context—this 
search would be allowed.  But under Gant, the search would only be 
allowed if the court believes the arrestee retained the possibility of 
accessing the bag.  Only then could the arrestee gain a weapon or destroy 
evidence.  Although this interpretation may not alter when an officer can 
conduct a search in a vast majority of cases outside those involving an 
automobile, the alteration is necessary to carry out Chimel’s policy goals. 
Second, Gant extends to all searches because the Court replanted the 
entire doctrine in Chimel, a case that did not concern automobile 
searches.  The fact that the Court reiterated Chimel’s policy concerns in a 
vehicle context does not lead to the conclusion that the restrictions apply 
only to vehicle searches.  Indeed, the Court construed Chimel to stand for 
the principle that any 
area from within which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a 
weapon or destructible evidence . . . continues to define the boundaries 
of the exception, ensur[ing] that the scope of a search incident to arrest 
is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and 
safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee 
might conceal or destroy.212 
Chimel did not involve an automobile search, but the proper scope of a 
search incident to an arrest is the area surrounding the arrestee in his 
home.213  Thus, because Chimel did not deal with automobile searches, 
and Gant’s holding overturned Belton and retethered automobile 
searches to a nonautomobile case, it does not follow that Gant fails to 
apply outside the vehicle context.  This is essentially the transitive 
theory: Belton concerns Chimel’s “application to the automobile 
context.”214  Gant reversed Belton as inconsistent with Chimel because 
when the person has no access to the area, she is per se unable to gain a 
weapon or destroy evidence.  Thus, any search in which the arrestee does 
not have access to the area being searched is inconsistent with Chimel as 
modified by Gant. 
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Another lens through which to view this progression is simpler: 
Gant’s broad dicta govern all searches incident to arrest.  The Court did 
not issue a broad holding because the only issue before it was whether 
Belton was inconsistent with Chimel.215  Nevertheless, a search is only 
proper if the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance—or has 
access to—the area of the search at the time of the search.216  The 
emphasis on Chimel’s twin purposes should be read as an attempt by the 
Court to reassert the original purpose and meaning of the search incident 
to arrest exception. 
Third, although officers in the field and courts prefer bright-line 
rules, Gant shows that this Court is comfortable straying from such rules 
if they are inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment and Chimel.  
Important, again, is the progression from Belton to Gant.  Belton was the 
Court’s attempt to “alleviate the case-by-case analysis that was taking 
place” at the time.217  Thus, because Gant repudiated Belton, it also 
signaled the Court’s willingness to return, albeit gingerly, to a case-by-
case approach. 
Lastly, although there are countless exceptions, one must remember 
that the Fourth Amendment prohibits searches without a warrant.  And 
the search incident to arrest doctrine is only an exception to a 
constitutional guarantee.218  This exception should be read narrowly and 
limited to those situations in which society does not require a neutral and 
detached magistrate to stand between the citizen and “the officer engaged 
in the . . . competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”219  Indeed, “[t]he 
point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous 
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual 
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.”220  One should 
err on the side of respecting a constitutional guarantee.  The most 
effective way to ground the search incident to arrest exception in the 
Chimel factors is to require police officers to determine case by case 
whether the person has access to the area being searched and whether the 
need to protect officer safety and preserve evidence is present.  Indeed, 
the Court noted that “[c]onstruing Belton broadly to allow vehicle 
searches incident to any arrest would serve no purpose except to provide 
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a police entitlement, and it is anathema to the Fourth Amendment to 
permit a warrantless search on that basis.”221 
The argument that Gant is limited to the vehicle context certainly has 
merit.  The Eighth Circuit held that because the Court spoke of limiting 
the search in the vehicle context, the limitations likely did not extend 
further than the vehicle context.222  But, before discussing the exception 
in the vehicle context specifically, the Court first reiterated that Chimel’s 
policy objectives lord over the exception generally.223  Because Gant 
conclusively stated that Chimel justifies and defines the exception, all 
searches now should be justified by a case-by-case determination that the 
search was needed either for officer safety or evidence gathering, which 
only occurs when the person has access to the area. 
The battle between expanding police officers’ search capability and 
expanding criminal defendants’ right to be free from unreasonable 
searches is a zero-sum game; providing criminal defendants increased 
protections from searches chips away at police officers’ ability to search.  
It is acceptable that some searches previously allowable are now 
unjustified, however, because the overriding purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment is to do just that: limit warrantless searches to only the times 
when they are needed most. Stating simply that police officers lose 
abilities to search is not a sufficient concern for continuing broad 
searches when the arrestee cannot access weapons or evidence in the area 
being searched. 
B. The Third Circuit’s Access Factor Test Should Govern 
After concluding that Gant applies outside the vehicle context 
because the Chimel policy concerns require that the arrestee have the 
ability to access a weapon or destroy evidence from the area to be 
searched, one must fashion a test that accounts for this conclusion while 
also making the test as simple as possible for officers to apply in the 
field.  Courts should adopt the Third Circuit’s test that focuses on 
whether the arrestee has access to the area of the search at the time of the 
search.  First, it comports with Gant’s reestablishment of the Chimel 
justifications as the only proper justifications governing when a search 
incident to an arrest can occur as well as the scope of that search.  Access 
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justifies the search because without access to the search area there is no 
way to satisfy either Chimel justification.  If there is no access, the 
arrestee cannot get a weapon or destroy evidence.  Therefore, an access 
limitation “ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is 
commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and 
safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might 
conceal or destroy.”224 
The Third Circuit in United States v. Shakir felt the applicable 
question courts must ask when evaluating a post-Gant container search 
incident to arrest is whether, under all the circumstances, the arrestee has 
retained “sufficient potential access to his bag” to access a weapon or 
destroy evidence.225  Gant focused on whether the suspect is secured and 
whether the suspect has access to the area.226  Shakir focused on whether 
the suspect has access to the area to be searched rather than simply 
holding the search invalid once the person is technically secured.227  But 
a test that considers whether the area being searched is one that the 
arrestee could access—the second prong of the Gant test—suits Gant’s 
desire to reign in the scope of the search incident to arrest exception. 
The test should focus on three main factors: (1) whether and how the 
arrestee is restrained, (2) where the arrest and search occur, and (3) 
whether the suspect is thought to be acting alone.  Applying this test, the 
police’s ability to search does not simply end once the suspect is 
handcuffed.228  All courts have held that handcuffs are not a surefire way 
to prevent someone from accessing weapons or destroying evidence; 
therefore, officers are often able to search a container or an area even 
after they have put the suspect in handcuffs and are waiting to place her 
in a car.229  But, once she is placed in the car, the need for the immediate, 
warrantless search ends, and the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant. 
This test comports with Gant’s reestablishment of the Chimel 
justifications by requiring that the arrestee have actual access to the area 
to be searched.  Gant did two main things: (1) resurrected the Chimel 
policy justifications and (2) modified and strengthened those 
justifications by noting that the search is per se unreasonable when the 
person has no access to or is adequately secured from the area to be 
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searched.230  A showing of access must not be limited to vehicle 
searches, but should extend to all searches incident to arrest.  Access, as 
the access factor test recognizes, is the key element to Gant and Chimel. 
A case-by-case analysis is necessary to ensure that Fourth 
Amendment protections are not swallowed by a broad search incident to 
arrest exception.  In Gant, the Court signaled its desire to abandon Belton 
and return to Chimel.231  Because Belton itself was an attempt to 
“alleviate the case-by-case analysis that was taking place” at the time,232 
it follows that the Court is comfortable with, or even wanted, a return to 
a case-by-case analysis.  The Third Circuit’s access factor test is the best 
method for undertaking this case-by-case analysis without making it 
overly complicated.  This approach best addresses the Supreme Court’s 
desire to reconnect the search incident to arrest with the need to protect 
officer safety and evidence gathering while balancing that desire against 
the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee that people be free from warrantless 
searches. 
This approach provides police a wide berth to search, but curtails 
borderline searches that are “anathema to the Fourth amendment.”233  
The Eighth Circuit case United States v. Perdoma is one example of the 
type of search, routinely upheld before Gant’s extension outside the 
vehicle context, that should be considered anathema to the Fourth 
Amendment after Gant.234  Although the access factor test is relatively 
malleable—which should give government officials reason to like it—it 
cannot be contorted to uphold the search in Perdoma where the suspect 
was secured by two officers, the bag was carried by the police from 
where Perdoma dropped it to the area near where Perdoma was being 
held, and there was no indication of nearby accomplices.235 
Perdoma can be analyzed using the three factors outlined above.236  
First, the suspect was secured—he was in handcuffs and surrounded by a 
few police officers with handguns at the time of the search.237  This 
strongly suggests that he could not have accessed the bag and that the 
Chimel justifications no longer existed there; after all, if he cannot access 
the bag, how can he grab a weapon or destroy evidence?  Next, the 
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officer found the bag at a distance from where Perdoma was secured, 
carried the bag back to the area where Perdoma was held, and only then 
searched the bag while Perdoma was secured by two officers.  Again, 
this cautions that he could not have accessed the bag.  Lastly, there is no 
indication in the case that the suspect was thought to have accomplices in 
the area because he was dropped off alone, he had not spoken with 
anyone, and the police had no information that the suspect was meeting 
anyone.238  Although the police certainly wanted to avoid the hassle of 
obtaining a warrant, this search was not justified. 
The first factor of the access factor test—whether the suspect is 
secured—is the most critical and merits more discussion.  Certainly, as 
the Eighth Circuit stated in Perdoma, a handcuffed suspect could 
possibly escape the grip of her captors and access “items in that 
room.”239  But, certainly at some point a suspect is sufficiently secured, 
yet still outside a patrol car, that she could not reasonably access the area 
to be searched.  The argument that a suspect who is handcuffed, 
surrounded by a number of armed officers, and held at a distance from 
the area to be searched is still unsecured and able to access the area is at 
some point unsupportable.  Indeed, such a holding is a Belton-like legal 
fiction that the Court repudiated in Gant.240  In Belton, the Court 
concluded the entire passenger compartment of the car was per se within 
an arrestee’s reaching distance.241  Similarly, concluding that a restrained 
and secured suspect could hypothetically escape the grasp of a team of 
officers to access a certain area to uphold the search commits the same 
error that Gant corrected.  Lower courts should apply Gant’s theory, and 
its broad dicta, to hold unreasonable these previously justifiable searches. 
Thus, the Third Circuit’s test is preferable.  It reestablishes the 
Chimel prongs while strengthening the analysis by focusing on whether 
the arrestee has access to the area, which dictates whether he could gain a 
weapon or evidence.  Even still, it is relatively simple to apply, 
especially for a factor test.  Searches anathema to the Fourth Amendment 
must not be tolerated, and applying the access factor test to borderline 
searches outside the vehicle context is a great start to reestablishing the 
warrant requirement. 
C. Problems with the Approach 
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Without bright-line rules, courts are left to determine whether a 
police officer’s search is justified as necessary for officer protection or 
evidence gathering on a case-by-case basis.  The most obvious problem 
is that this test is not a hard-and-fast rule; a court will now require 
officers operating in confusing environments to determine whether the 
arrestee has access to the container or area of the room before they can 
search.  Certainly, the rule established by the Third Circuit and 
advocated for in this Comment cuts against what Justice Rehnquist 
wanted to avoid by establishing bright-line rules: 
A custodial arrest is fluid and “[t]he danger to the police officer flows 
from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and 
uncertainty,” . . . .  The stress is no less merely because the arrestee 
exited his car before the officer initiated contact, nor is an arrestee less 
likely to attempt to lunge for a weapon or to destroy evidence if he is 
outside of, but still in control of, the vehicle. In either case, the officer 
faces a highly volatile situation.  It would make little sense to apply two 
different rules to what is, at bottom, the same situation. 
 In some circumstances it may be safer and more effective for 
officers to conceal their presence from a suspect until he has left his 
vehicle.  Certainly that is a judgment officers should be free to 
make. . . .  The Fourth Amendment does not require such a gamble.242 
Unfortunately, there is no way to marry true adherence to the Chimel 
justifications and bright-line rules.  A determination that one or both of 
the Chimel justifications is met—as the Court required in Gant—can 
only be done after a police officer surveys the scene.  But, this restriction 
comports with the fact that searches incident to a lawful arrest are 
exceptions to the general warrant requirement.  Warrants require 
approval on a case-by-case basis and are not given out in bunches.  Once 
there is no danger to police officers, the search incident to arrest 
justifications are largely moot, and the judicial process should take its 
rightful place governing the relationship between society and an arrestee. 
The dissenting Justices in Gant felt that the majority’s restrictions 
would have the perverse effect of decreasing officer safety because 
officers would risk keeping suspects unsecured so they can have free 
reign to search.243  First, this is only troublesome from an officer-safety 
perspective if one assumes that officers keep dangerous people 
unsecured out in the open to avoid the pain of getting a warrant to 
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conduct a search of an area that would otherwise be off-limits post-Gant.  
One hopes police officers would secure their own safety before digging 
through a backpack looking for evidence they likely could access in a 
short time either by getting a warrant or through another exception.  A 
second answer is that while the officer-safety criticism may be valid, it is 
a red herring.  The Fourth Amendment provides protections for the 
general public, not law enforcement, and its protections are not an 
annoyance but a central tenet of America’s criminal justice system.   
Gant’s restrictions should apply to all searches incident to arrests, 
and such a search is improper if the arrestee does not have access to the 
area searched at the time of the search.  Although such a rule could prove 
frustrating to zealous officers, erring on the side of more-vigorous 
protection of a constitutional protection is always preferable.  Lastly, 
arresting officers may always search a person to protect themselves and 
“always have a less intrusive and more effective means of ensuring their 
safety—and a means that is virtually always employed: ordering the 
arrestee away from the vehicle, patting him down in the open, 
handcuffing him, and placing him in the squad car.”244 
Finally, as noted above, this test sets a higher bar than simply 
allowing an officer to search whenever there is reason to believe 
evidence of the crime may be found.  But, this higher standard is justified 
because “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions.”245 
V. CONCLUSION 
The restrictions placed on vehicle searches in Gant should extend to 
all searches incident to an arrest. The Supreme Court had been in the 
business of creating bright-line rules governing the search incident to 
arrest exception for thirty years before Gant.  But, any search that is 
incompatible with the underlying policy concerns the Court announced 
in Chimel and reestablished in Gant—the need to prevent the arrestee 
from gaining a weapon or destroying evidence—cannot be tolerated no 
matter how easy to apply the rule is.  Gant should extend outside the 
vehicle context because Gant’s reasoning easily applies to all searches 
incident to arrest; the only way an arrestee may get a weapon or destroy 
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evidence is if she has access to the area to be searched at the time of the 
search.  Thus, access is the key to creating a test that respects the Fourth 
Amendment’s general prohibition against warrantless searches.  In short, 
Gant changed everything.  It destroyed Belton’s bright-line rule 
governing vehicle searches and indicated a likely death for all other 
searches incident to arrest that are not justified by either officer safety or 
evidence preservation. 
Courts around the country are now being asked to fashion new rules 
governing searches incident to arrest for container searches, room 
searches, and luggage searches.  These new rules not only should 
conform to the Chimel justifications, but also should recognize that these 
decisions are made in tense, murky situations.  The Third Circuit’s 
access factor test as enhanced by the Northern District of Oklahoma is 
the preferable test.  This test respects the Fourth Amendment, requires 
officers to justify searches by satisfying one of the two Chimel prongs, 
and, because it is limited in its number of factors, is relatively easy to 
apply in the field.  The Fourth Amendment requires such a rule. 
 
